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1. Introduction
The idea that nominal wages are more downwardly rigid, than upwardly rigid, has a long history in
economics. Earlier references include Keynes (1936), who discusses the role of downward nominal
wage rigidity in business cycle uctuations; Tobin (1972), who suggests that a positive rate of
ination may be socially benecial in an economy where cutting nominal wages is privately costly;
and Harris and Holmstrom (1982), who show that the optimal long-term contract has an insurance
component whereby the (real) wage never falls in a setup where rms are risk-neutral and workers
are risk-averse.
Furthermore, downward nominal wage rigidity has received ample empirical support from a
large body of research based on micro data at the individual, rm and industry levels. Research on
wage changes at the individual level nds that its distribution has a peak at zero, features few wage
cuts, and is positively skewed. This is so even in countries, like Japan and Switzerland, where
ination is very low or even negative.1 Surveys on attitudes towards nominal wage cuts show that
both workers and rms dislike them, but for di¤erent reasons. Workers perceive nominal wage
cuts as unfair (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986), while rms are generally concerned about
the e¤ect of wage cuts on morale and, in practice, only cut wages when facing bankruptcy (Bewley,
1995, and Campbell and Kamlani, 1997).
This paper is concerned with the macroeconomic implications of downward nominal wage rigid-
ity, in particular for monetary policy. To that end we build a small-scale, dynamic stochastic
general-equilibrium (DSGE) model where the cost of adjusting prices and wages may be asymmet-
ric. We follow the Neo Keynesian literature in postulating a simple mechanism to model nominal
frictions in the goods and labor markets, but relax the assumption that frictions are symmetric
around the current price or wage.2 In particular, we adopt an adjustment cost specication based
on the linex function due to Varian (1974), which includes the quadratic function in Rotemberg
(1982) as a special case. Hence in our model, adjustment costs depend not only of the size but also
on the sign of the adjustment. For example, a nominal wage cut may involve a larger frictional
cost that an increase of exactly the same magnitude. The nonlinear model based on a second-order
1See, McLaughlin (1994), Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996), Card and Hyslop (1997), and Barattieri, Basu and
Gottschalk (2009) for the United States; Farès and Lemieux (2001) for Canada, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003)
for Japan, Castellanos Castellanos, Garcia-Verdú and Kaplan (2004) for Mexico, and Fehr and Goette (2005) for
Switzerland. The same characteristics are found by Holden and Wulfsberg (2008) in the distribution of wage changes
at the industry level in various OECD countries.
2Two widely-used mechanisms for nominal frictions are due to Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo (1983). In the former,
agents face a quadratic (and, hence, symmetric) cost for changing prices or wages. In the latter, only agents that
receive an exogenous signal are allowed to re-optimize their price or wage. Solving a rst-order approximation to a
model with Calvo-type rigidity imposes symmetry by construction.
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approximation is estimated by the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) and a simple t test is
used to evaluate whether the macro data supports the view that nominal wages are downwardly
rigid.
This project builds on but makes a distinct contribution from our previous work; Kim and
Ruge-Murcia (2009) carries out the analysis using a cashless economy and is primarily concerned
with the optimal amount of grease ination. In contrast, this paper studies the positive im-
plications of downward wage rigidity which are not examined in our earlier contribution and
does so in the context of a fully-edged monetary economy. From the modeling perspective, this
paper extends Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) by characterizing the role of money as a medium of
exchange. Modeling money is important for the normative analysis of monetary policy. In the
cashless environment of Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), downward wage rigidly trivially induces a
positive optimal rate of ination, as was anticipated by Tobin (1972). Thus, the object of interest
in our previous paper is not the level of ination per se, but rather the extra optimal ination
induced by asymmetric costs compared with symmetric costs (that is, greaseination).
In a monetary economy, ination or even modest deation as far as the nominal interest rate is
positive leads to the ine¢ cient economizing in money balances. Thus, in the absence of nominal
frictions, the optimal ination rate is negative and equal to the Friedmans rule (Friedman, 1969).
In many previous models with nominal frictions, optimal ination rate is larger than the Friedmans
rule but still negative (see, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford 1997). However, if nominal wages
are downwardly rigid, the monetary authority faces a non-trivial trade-o¤. Explicit modeling of
this trade-o¤ is important because there is currently a discrepancy between economic theory and
monetary policy in practice. The former prescribes a zero-to-negative optimal ination rate while
the latter targets low, but strictly positive, ination rates. In a sense, our quantitative analysis has
the avor of a (friendly) match between two old long-standing views of optimal monetary policy,
namely those of James Tobin and Milton Friedman.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model; Section 3 describes the data and
method used to estimate the model, reports parameter estimates, and studies aggregate implications
of downward nominal wage rigidly; Section 4 computes the optimal ination rate and derives the
optimal responses to shocks under the Ramsey policy that maximizes social welfare; Section 5
computes the optimal ination target under a strict targeting policy; and Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
The economy consists of i) a continuum of innitely-lived households with di¤erentiated job skills,
ii) a continuum of rms that produce di¤erentiated goods using labor as sole input, and iii) a
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government that implements monetary policy using a Taylor-type rule. Households and rms
interact in markets with frictions where adjusting nominal wages and prices involves convex and
(possibly) asymmetric costs. The model is a monetary version of the one developed in Kim and
Ruge-Murcia (2009) and we refer the reader to that article for a more detailed discussion about
functional forms and modeling assumptions.
2.1 Households
Household h 2 [0; 1] maximizes
Es
1X
t=s
t sU(cht ; n
h
t ); (1)
where Es denotes the expectation conditional on information available at time s;  2 (0; 1) is
the discount factor, U () is the instantaneous utility function, cht is consumption, and nht is hours
worked. Consumption is an aggregate of all di¤erentiated goods available in the economy
cht =
0@ 1Z
0
(chj;t)
1=dj
1A ; (2)
where  > 1 is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between goods. The
price of this consumption bundle is
Pt =
0@ 1Z
0
(Pj;t)
1=(1 )dj
1A1  ; (3)
where Pj;t is the price of good j: Pt serves as the aggregate price index in our model economy and
the gross rate of price ination is then t+1 = Pt+1=Pt:
Households choose their nominal wage taking as given the rmsdemand for their labor type
and face a convex cost whenever they adjust its value. This cost is represented by the function
(see Varian, 1974)
ht = (W
h
t =W
h
t 1) = 
 
exp(   W ht =W ht 1   1) +   W ht =W ht 1   1  1
 2
!
; (4)
where   0 and  are cost parameters. For the analysis below, it is important to keep in mind
two special cases of this function. First, when  ! 0; (4) becomes a quadratic function. The
symmetry of the quadratic form implies that nominal wage increases or decreases of the same
magnitude are equally costly. Second, when  > 0; cutting nominal wages is generally more costly
than raising them and so wages are downwardly rigid. These two cases are plotted in Figure 1.
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Another special case that is nested in (4) is the Lshape used by Benigno and Ricci (2008), which
corresponds to the situation where  ! 1 and implies that wage cuts are innitely costly while
wage increases are costless.
The households budget constraint is
cht (1+f(c
h
t ;m
h
t ))+
Mht  Mht 1
Pt
+
Bht   it 1Bht 1
Pt
+
QtA
h
t  Aht 1
Pt
=

W ht n
h
t
Pt

1  ht

+
T ht
Pt
+
Dht
Pt
;
where mht =M
h
t =Pt is real money balances, M
h
t is nominal money balances, B
h
t is nominal bonds,
it is the gross nominal interest rate, Aht is complete portfolio of state-contingent securities, Qt is
a vector of prices, T ht is a lump-sum transfer, D
h
t is dividends, and f(c
h
t ;m
h
t ) is a transaction cost
function that captures the idea that money facilitates consumption purchases and motivates money
demand on the part of households. Since markets are complete, there is no loss of generality in
assuming that wage adjustment costs are paid by the household.
For the rest of the paper, we assume the following functional forms for the instantaneous utility
and the transaction cost
U(cht ; n
h
t ) =
 
cht
1 
1     n
h
t ; (5)
f(cht ;m
h
t ) = a

cht
mht

+ b

mht
cht

  2
p
ab; (6)
where ; a and b are positive parameters and cht =m
h
t is the consumption velocity of money. The
linear representation of the households disutility of labor is based on the indivisible-labor model
due to Hansen (1985). The form of the transaction cost function is due to Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004a) and implies a money demand elasticity with respect to consumption equal to unity.
Utility maximization implies an optimal consumption demand for good j of the form
chj;t =

Pj;t
Pt
 =( 1)
cht ; (7)
where =(   1) is the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price of good j: Optimal
money demand is implicitly dened by
t
 
1 + b  a

cht
mht
2!
= Et

t+1
t+1

; (8)
where t is the households marginal utility. The term b a(cht =mht )2 corresponds to cht @f(cht ;mht )=@mht
and would equal to zero if households were satiated with money, as they would be under the Fried-
mans rule.
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2.2 Firms
Firm j 2 [0; 1] produces a di¤erentiated good using the technology
yj;t = xtn
1 
j;t ; (9)
where yj;t is output of good j, nj;t is labor input, xt is an aggregate productivity shock, and
 2 (0; 1) is a constant parameter. The productivity shock follows the process
ln(xt) = (1  ) ln(x) +  ln(xt 1) + ut; (10)
where  2 ( 1; 1) and ut is a disturbance term. The disturbance is independently and identically
distributed (i:i:d:) with mean zero and standard deviation u:
The labor input is an aggregate of di¤erentiated labor supplied by households. The aggregator
takes the form
nj;t =
0@ 1Z
0
(nhj;t)
1=dh
1A ; (11)
where  > 1 is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between labor types. The
price of the labor input is
Wj;t =
0@ 1Z
0
(W ht )
1=(1 )dh
1A1  ; (12)
where W ht is the nominal wage demanded by the supplier of labor type h.
Firms choose their nominal price taking as given the consumption demand for their good and
subject to a convex cost for price changes. The real per-unit cost of a price change is
 jt =  (Pj;t=Pj;t 1) = 

exp( & (Pj;t=Pj;t 1   1)) + & (Pj;t=Pj;t 1   1)  1
&2

; (13)
where Pj;t is the nominal price of good j at time t, and   0 and & are cost parameters. For the
rest of the analysis, we focus on the case where & ! 0 meaning that price adjustment costs are
quadratic, as in Rotemberg (1982).
Firm j maximizes
Es
1X
t=s
t s

t
s

Dj;t
Pt

;
where
Dj;t = Pj;t(1   jt )cj;t  
1Z
0
(W ht n
h
t )dh (14)
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is nominal prots, which are transferred to households in the form of dividends. In the denition
(14), cj;t denotes the total consumption demand for good j; which is simply the integral over the
individual householdsdemands. That is, cj;t =
1R
0
chj;tdh: Prot maximization implies the optimal
labor demand schedule
nht =

W ht
Wt
 =( 1)
nt; (15)
where =(   1) is the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price of labor of type h:
2.3 Government
The government sets monetary policy using the interest rate rule
ln(it=i) = 1 log(it 1=i) + 2 log(t=) + 3 log(yt=y) + vt; (16)
where 1 2 (0; 1), 2 and 3 are constant parameters, variables without time subscript denote
steady-state values, and vt is an i:i:d: disturbance with mean zero and standard deviation v:
The government supplies the money balances that households demand at this interest rate using
lump-sum transfers or taxes to adjusts the money stock. Hence,
Tt
Pt
=
Mt  Mt 1
Pt
:
where the right-hand side is seigniorage revenue.
2.4 Equilibrium
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all households and rms are identical ex-post and so
Arrow-Debreu securities and bonds are not held by any household. Substituting the government
budget constraint and the prots of the (now) representative rm into the budget constraint of the
(now) representative household delivers the economy-wide resource constraint
ct(1 + f(ct;mt)) = yt(1   t)  (Wtnt=Pt)t: (17)
This equation shows that price and wage adjustment cost are deadweight losses that reduce the
quantity of output available for consumption. Since the losses are minimized when ination is zero,
many models with sticky prices prescribe zero ination as a criterion for good policy.
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3. Solution and Estimation
The model is solved by taking a second-order expansion of the optimality conditions, the resource
constraint, and the monetary policy rule, around the models deterministic steady state.3 The
solution method is explained in detail by Jin and Judd (2002), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b),
and Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2008). The rest of this section explains the issues regarding
estimation of the second-order approximate solution.
3.1 Data
The data used to estimate the model are quarterly observations of hours worked, real consumption
per capita, real money balances per capita, the price ination rate, the wage ination rate, and
the nominal interest rate between 1964Q2 to 2006Q2. The raw data were taken from the FRED
database available at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis web site (www.stls.frb.org). The rates
of price and wage ination are measured by the percentage change in the consumer price index
(CPI) and the average hourly earnings for private industries, respectively; real money balances is
M2 per capita divided by the CPI; real consumption is personal consumption expenditures per
capita divided by the CPI; population is the quarterly average of the mid-month U.S. population
estimated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); hours worked are measured by the aggregate
weekly hours index for total private industries produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS);
and the nominal interest rate is the e¤ective federal funds rate. The original interest rate series,
which is quoted as a net annual rate, was transformed into a gross quarterly rate. Except for the
nominal interest rate, all data are seasonally adjusted at the source. All series were logged and
linearly detrended prior to the estimation of the model.
3.2 SMM Estimation
The second-order approximate solution of our nonlinear DSGE model is estimated using the Simu-
lated Method of Moments (SMM). Ruge-Murcia (2009) explains in detail the application of SMM
to the estimation of higher-order DSGE models and reports Monte-Carlo evidence on their small-
sample properties. Intuitively, SMM involves the minimization of the weighted distance between
3Since money is not superneutral in the deterministic steady state, the levels consumption, labor input and real
balances must be jointly found from the numerical solution of a system of three nonlinear equations. For the
estimation of the model, this approach is computationally demanding because this system must be solved in each
iteration of the optimization routine that minimizes the statistical objective function (see Section 3.2). Thus, we
follow the simpler approach of solving analytically for steady-state consumption and labor input treating money as
superneutral, and then computing the real balances demanded at that level of consumption. The steady state values
computed in this manner di¤er only after the fth decimal place from those obtained by numerically solving the
system of nonlinear equations.
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the unconditional moments predicted by the model and those computed from the data, where the
former are obtained by means of stochastic simulation. In this application, the weighting matrix
is the diagonal of the inverse of the matrix with the long-run variance of the moments, which was
computed using the Newey-West estimator. The number of simulated observations is ten times
larger than the sample size with innovations drawn from the normal distribution.4 The dynamic
simulations of the nonlinear model are based on the pruned version of the solution, as suggested
by Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2008). The moments used in the estimation are the six
variances, fteen covariances, and the rst- to fourth-order autocovariances of our data series.
We estimate twelve structural parameters. The parameters are those of the price and wage
adjustment cost functions (,  and  ), the transaction cost function (a and b), the monetary policy
rule (1, 2; 3 and v), the productivity shock process ( and u), and the consumption curvature
in the utility function (). Additional information is used to x the values of four parameters to
economically plausible numbers during the estimation routine. These parameters are the curvature
of the production function, the discount factor, and the elasticities of substitution between goods
and between labor types ( and , respectively). Data from the U.S. National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) shows that the share of labor in total income is approximately 2=3 and, hence,
a plausible value for  is 1=3. The discount rate is set to 0:997; which is the inverse the average
gross real interest rate during the sample period. Finally, the elasticities of substitution between
goods and between labor types are xed to  = 1:1 and  = 1:4; respectively, which are standard
values in the literature.
In addition to the model with asymmetric wage adjustment costs, we also estimate the restricted
model with quadratic costs that corresponds to the case where  = 0: The restricted model provides
a useful benchmark to evaluate the implications of downward nominal wage rigidity.
3.3 Parameter Estimates
SMM estimates of the model parameters are reported in the rst column of Table 1. The size
of relative risk aversion in consumption is  = 1:746 (0:401): (The number in parenthesis is the
standard error.) This estimate is larger than, but not statistically di¤erent from, unity that
corresponds to the case of logarithmic preferences. Estimates of the transaction cost function are
a = 0:009 and b = 0:133, which are similar to the values 0:011 and 0:075 as reported by Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2004a). This result is interesting because the estimation approaches followed
4We use an antithetic accelerator in the simulation of the articial data. The idea is to increase the e¢ ciency
of the nite sample estimator of the moments by using (antithetic) variates that are deliberately induced to have a
negative correlation. In practice, this means that the simulated sample consists of two subsamples of equal length:
one based on a given draw of random innovations and another based on the negative values of the same draw. This
strategy delivers the smallest possible correlation of  1 (see, Ripley, 1987).
8
in these two papers are rather di¤erent: We structurally estimate a full nonlinear DGSE model,
while Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe compute their estimates from a reduced-form ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression of consumption velocity on a constant and the nominal interest rate.
Both prices and wages are rigid in the sense that the null hypotheses  = 0 and  = 0 can
be rejected at the one percent signicance level.5 The wage asymmetry parameter is  = 7146:3
(1840:4); which is positive and statistically di¤erent from zero.6 Based on this result, we conclude
that nominal wages are downwardly rigid. This nding is important because, as we will show
below, downward wage rigidity modies previous conclusions regarding the relative importance of
price versus wage rigidity, the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks, and the optimal rate of ination.
Consider the restricted version of our model where  = 0 so that adjustment costs are quadratic
and, hence, symmetric. Parameter estimates for this model are reported in the second column of
Table 1. In this case,  () fully captures the degree of nominal wage (price) rigidity. Since 
is much larger than  (711:3 and 42:0; respectively), one is tempted to conclude that wages are
generally more rigid than prices. In contrast, in the model with asymmetric adjustment costs,
nominal rigidity depends on the asymmetry parameter as well. Since  is quantitatively close to
 but the wage asymmetry parameter is positive and large, we conclude instead that prices and
wages are similarly upwardly rigid but that wages are more downwardly rigid than prices. This
is more that a semantic renement because, as we will show below, the e¤ects of monetary shocks
are very di¤erent in the models with quadratic and asymmetric adjustment costs.
Finally, the coe¢ cients of the Taylor-type rule are in line with previous estimates reported
elsewhere in the literature (for example, Taylor, 1999, and the references therein).
3.4 Impulse Responses
We now study the implications of downward nominal wage rigidity for the economys response to
a monetary policy shock.7 Since the responses of nonlinear dynamic systems typically depend on
the sign, size and timing of the shock (see Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen, 1993, and Koop, Pesaran
and Potter, 1996), our experiments involve shocks of di¤erent signs and sizes. More precisely,
we consider innovations to the interest rate rule of +2; +1;  1 and  2 standard deviations. A
positive shock leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate and is therefore contractionary,
5Since the null lays at the boundary of the parameter space, the distribution of the t statistic is not standard (see,
Andrews, 2001). Hence, this result needs to be interpreted with caution and is best taken as indicative only.
6Though bigger, this estimate is not statistically di¤erent from 3844:4 as reported in our previous work (Kim and
Ruge-Murcia, 2009). In particular, our previous estimate is contained in the ninety-ve percent condence interval
around the estimate reported in this paper.
7 In preliminary work, we also examined the e¤ects of productivity shocks. These results are not reported here in
order to save space, but they are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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while a negative shock is expansionary. In all cases, we assume that a shock take place when the
system is at its stochastic steady state. That is, when all variables are equal to their unconditional
mean.
Figure 2 plots the responses of consumption, output, price ination, wage ination, real wage,
nominal interest, real interest, and real money balances in the economy where wages are downwardly
rigid. In all panels, the stochastic steady state is represented by the horizontal line, and the vertical
axis is the percentage deviation of each variable from its deterministic steady state. Hence,
the distance between this horizontal line and zero reects the models departure from certainty
equivalence. For instance, uncertainty induces lower average levels of consumption and output
than the deterministic steady state as a result of the precautionary savings motive on the part of
households. In the gure, the rates of price ination, wage ination, nominal interest and real
interest are annualized.
The most obvious observation in Figure 2 is that, when wages are downwardly rigid, the e¤ects
of monetary policy shocks are asymmetric. For example, a contractionary shock produces a quan-
titatively larger and more persistent movement in consumption and output than an expansionary
shock of the same magnitude. Starting at the unconditional mean, the contractionary shock of size
+2 standard deviations yields an initial decrease of 1:73 percent in consumption and 0:85 percent
in output, while the expansionary shock of size  2 yields increases of 1:03 and 0:53, respectively.
Also, the quantitative e¤ects of the larger shock (say +2 standard deviations) are more than twice
those of the smaller one (that is, +1 standard deviation). The nding that contractionary mone-
tary policy shocks produce larger real e¤ects than expansionary ones is line with evidence reported
by Cover (1992). Cover performs OLS regressions of output on a constant, measures of positive
and negative money supply shocks, and other controls, and he nds that contractionary shocks
have a larger e¤ect on output than expansionary shocks. Furthermore, he rejects the hypothesis
that contractionary and expansionary shocks induce output changes of the same magnitude.
Monetary shocks also have an asymmetric e¤ect on price and wage ination. The contractionary
shock of size +2 induces an initial decrease of 0:37 percent in price ination, while the expansionary
shock of the same magnitude induces an initial increase of 1:26 percent. The economy returns
to the stochastic steady state faster in the former than in the latter case. Since price rigidity is
symmetric, the asymmetric response of price ination is entirely due to the downward rigidity of
nominal wages through general equilibrium e¤ects. Also, in this case, the quantitative e¤ects of
the large negative shock are more than twice those of the smaller one, but the converse is true for
positive shocks.
The asymmetry is especially pronounced in the case of wage ination. In all experiments, a
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monetary shock delivers an increases in wage ination. Positive shocks induce larger responses
than negative shocks of the same magnitude, and feature almost no overshooting. These responses
on the part of price and wage ination imply that real wages rise after a monetary shock regardless
of whether the shock is expansionary or contractionary.8 In this sense, real wages are downwardly
rigid with respect to monetary policy shocks. The fact that the real wage may rise following an
expansionary monetary shock moderates the expected increase in output and consumption and
explains the asymmetric e¤ect of monetary shocks on these two variables.
Finally, there is also asymmetry in the responses of the nominal interest rate, the real interest
rate, and the real balance. For example, in the case of the real interest rate, contractionary shocks
produce generally smaller responses than expansionary shocks of the same magnitude, with the
former generally more persistent than the latter.
It is useful to compare these responses with the ones implied by the model with the quadratic
adjustment costs. These responses are plotted in Figure 3 and show that an expansionary shock
induces an increase in consumption, output, price ination, wage ination and real money balances
and a decrease in the real wage and the rates of real and nominal interest. The contractionary
shock induces the converse e¤ects. Responses are approximately symmetric meaning that positive
and negative monetary shocks generate dynamics that are almost mirror images of each other.
Comparing Figures 2 and 3 shows substantial di¤erences in the magnitude and persistence of
responses for most variables. In particular, there are large quantitative and qualitative di¤erences
in the responses of wage ination and the real wage. The response of wage ination to either an
expansionary or a contractionary shock are relatively small under the quadratic model as a result
of the large estimate of the wage rigidity parameter. Instead, under the asymmetric model, the
response to an expansionary shock is very large, while the response to a contractionary shock is
relatively muted as a result of downward nominal wage rigidity. The responses of the real wage
are also very di¤erent under both models, especially for expansionary monetary policy shocks.
4. Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section, we study optimal policy in a monetary economy where wages are downwardly
rigid. In particular, we consider the problem of a government that follows the Ramsey policy of
maximizing the representative households welfare subject to the aggregate resource constraint and
the optimality conditions for rms and households. The government is assumed to use the same
discount factor as households in evaluating future utilities and to credibly commit to implementing
8This result, however, is not general. For small contractionary shocks, say of size 0:5 standard deviations, wage
ination and the real wage fall a little and approach their steady state from below.
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the optimal policy. We again approximate the model to the second order, and the resulting
decision rules are used to compute the optimal average ination rate and the optimal responses to
productivity shocks.
4.1 Optimal Ination Target
The optimal average rate of gross ination is dened as the level at the stochastic steady state
under the Ramsey policy. Recall that, by denition, the unconditional mean of all variables is
their stochastic steady state. We compute these means from the decision rules using the parameter
values reported in the left column of Table 1. Results indicate that mean gross ination is 1.0040,
meaning that optimal net ination is 0.40 percent per year. In contrast to earlier literature on
optimal monetary policy,9 the optimal (net) ination rate is positive. That is, for an economy with
downwardly rigid wages, the benets of positive ination conjectured by Tobin (1972) overcome
Friedmans (1969) general prescription of negative ination. As in the cashless economy in Kim
and Ruge-Murcia (2009), this result is driven by prudence: The Ramsey planner prefers to incur
the systematic, but small, price and wage adjustment costs associated with positive ination rate
rather than taking the chance of having to pay the large adjustment costs required to implement
nominal wage decreases. However, in contrast to Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), this is so even
after taking into account the benets of negative ination as pointed out by Friedman.
We now examine how the optimal ination rate varies with the volatility of the productivity
shock. Figure 4 plots optimal ination as a function of the standard deviation of the productivity
innovation. The range of the standard deviation is [0; 0:025]: Notice that when there is no
uncertainty, meaning that u = 0; optimal ination is 0:9994: Thus, without a precautionary
motive, optimal ination falls between Friedmans rule and zero. As volatility increases, optimal
ination increases in u: The relation is quadratic because the decision rules are linear in the
conditional variance of productivity and, hence, quadratic in its standard deviation. The value for
optimal average ination reported above, namely 1:0040; corresponds to the SMM estimate of u
at 0:011:
Finally, it is interesting to compute optimal grease ination for this monetary economy. Fol-
lowing Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), we measure optimal grease ination as the extra amount of
ination implied by asymmetric costs compared with symmetric costs. As we reported above, for
the case where  = 7146:3 and wages are, therefore, downwardly rigid, optimal ination is 1:0040.
For the where  = 0 and wage adjustment costs are quadratic, optimal ination is 0:9989: Notice
9See, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Chari and Kehoe (1999), Teles (2003), Khan, King and
Wolman (2003), Kim and Henderson (2005), and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
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that in this case we recover the result reported in earlier literature. That is, in a monetary econ-
omy with sticky prices and wages, optimal (net) ination lies between Friedmans rule and zero.
Optimal grease ination is simply 1:0040   0:9989 = 0:0051, that is 0.51 percent per year. This
value is roughly similar to the one of 0:35 reported in our previous work. This result implies that
the amount of grease ination originally computed in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) for a cashless
economy is robust to modeling money as a medium of exchange.
4.2 Optimal Responses
The optimal responses to a productivity shock are reported in Figure 5. Following a positive
productivity shock, consumption and output increase before returning to their stochastic steady
state. An exogenous productivity increase permits a larger output with the same inputs and
this creates a wealth e¤ect that allows consumption to rise today and in the future. A negative
productivity shock has the converse e¤ects. There is some asymmetry between positive and
negative shocks, with the latter inducing larger adjustments than the former.
Positive (negative) shocks induce an initial decrease (increase) in price ination. There is
some asymmetry with respect to the shock size and the dynamics involve ination overshooting
its long-run value. The real wage increases following a positive shock and decreases following a
negative one, with the responses proportionally larger in the former case. In this sense, real wages
are downwardly rigid with respect to productivity shocks under the optimal policy.
There is considerable asymmetry in the responses of wage ination, the nominal and real interest
rates and real money balances to productivity shocks. In the case of wage ination, all shocks
induce an increase in wage ination. In particular, following a negative productivity shock and
in order to avoid incurring the large costs associated with nominal wage cuts, the Ramsey policy
involves wage increases throughout and instead the decrease in the real wage is implemented via an
increase in the price level. This result illustrates Tobins proposition that a positive rate of price
ination may be socially benecial in an economy with downwardly rigid wages.
Real money balances decrease (increase) after negative (positive) shocks. Responses are asym-
metric in that the e¤ects of a negative shock are larger than those of a positive shock of the same
magnitude. Since, by construction, the money stock is held xed in this experiment, this asym-
metry is due to the asymmetric responses to productivity shocks on the part of consumption and
the price level.
The optimal policy involves an increase in the nominal interest rate after a negative technology
shock and a decrease after a positive shock. The initial responses of the real interest rate are the
opposite: The real interest rate falls after a negative shock and rises after a positive one. However,
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after the second period the real interest rate responses are reversed and, therefore, equivalent to
those of the nominal rate. Note that responses are asymmetric. For example, the shock of size
 2 induces an increase in nominal rate of 1:21 percent while the positive shock of the same size
induces a decrease of 0:58. The very asymmetric response in the nominal interest rate under the
optimal policy allows a smoother, less asymmetric response on the part of consumption, output
and real balances to productivity shocks.10
5. Optimized Simple Policy
In order to study the normative implications of downward nominal wage rigidity under a policy
more realistic than the unconstrained Ramsey optimal policy, we now compute the ination rate
that delivers the highest (unconditional) welfare when the monetary authority follows a simple
policy rule that strictly hits an ination target regardless the state of the economy. Figure 6 plots
unconditional welfare, expressed in consumption equivalents, for di¤erent values of the target. The
benchmark policy is Friedmans rule, whereby the target is the discount rate, that is, (0:997)4 =
0:9881 at the annual rate. Notice in Figure 6 that a policy that targets deation (that is, a gross
ination rate less than 1) or strict price stability (that is, a gross ination rate equal to 1), deliver
a welfare loss compared with Friedmans rule. On the other hand, targeting gross ination rates a
bit larger than 1 (that is, positive rates of net ination) lead to signicant welfare gains compared
with Friedmans rule. The optimal ination target is 1.007, that is, 0.7 percent per year and
involves a welfare increase of 0:276 percent of consumption. This target is about twice as large as
that of the Ramsey policy. The reason is that positive ination in a model with downward wage
rigidity is driven by prudence. With limited knowledge and less exibility with respect to shocks,
the ination targeting government needs a larger bu¤er above zero ination to eschew paying the
costs associated with nominal wage cuts. Ination targets larger than the optimal one are still
superior to Friedmans rule and, since welfare decreases very slowly as the ination target rises,
they are only minimally less desirable. Thus, in a monetary economy with downwardly rigid prices,
a central banker should target a low, but strictly positive, ination rate.
6. Conclusion
This paper characterizes the positive and normative implications of downward nominal wage rigidity
for the conduct of monetary policy. The analysis is carried out using a simple DSGE model where
10Optimal asymmetric responses are also reported by Carlsson and Westermark (2008) and Kim and Ruge-Murcia
(2009) for more restrictive cashless economies. Our result here show that the asymmetries survive the inclusion of
an additional asset (money) that serves not only as a unit of account but can be used as a medium of exchange.
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money serves a medium of exchange and the cost of nominal wage changes may depend on both
sign and magnitude of the adjustment. The second-order approximation of the model is estimated
using quarterly aggregate U.S. data. The macro data supports the notion of downward nominal
wage rigidity in that the wage asymmetry parameter is larger than, and statistically di¤erent from,
zero.
From the positive perspective, results show that monetary policy shocks have asymmetric e¤ects
that are in line with empirical evidence (see Cover, 1992). For example, contractionary shocks
induce larger changes in output and consumption than expansionary shocks of the same magnitude.
From the normative perspective, the Ramsey policy that maximizes social welfare involves an
average ination rate of about 0.4 percent per year. Hence, for an economy with downwardly rigid
wages, the benets of positive ination conjectured by Tobin (1972) may overcome Friedmans
(1969) general prescription of negative ination. In the more realistic case of a central banker that
follows a simple targeting policy, the optimal ination target is about 0.7 percent per year. Since
welfare decreases slowly as ination rises beyond the optimal target, actual ination ranges like
one used in Canada from 1 to 3 percent deliver higher welfare than Friedmans rule and strict price
stability (i.e., a net ination rate equal to zero). We view this result as providing support for the
low, but strictly positive, ination targets used in many countries.
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Table 1. SMM Estimates
Wage Adjustment Costs
Description Symbol Asymmetric Quadratic
Consumption curvature  1:746 1:292
(0:401) (0:388)
Parameter of transaction function a 0:009 0:008
(0:121) (0:097)
Parameter of transaction function b 0:133 0:147
(0:022) (0:027)
Wage adjustment cost  215:9 711:3
(39:5) (168:6)
Price adjustment cost  77:5 42:0
(18:4) (23:4)
Wage asymmetry  7146:3 0
(1840:4)
Interest-rate smoothing 1 0:986 0:986y
(0:274) (0:514)
Ination coe¢ cient in policy rule 2 0:717y 1:286
(0:368) (1:008)
Output coe¢ cient in policy rule 3 0:058 0:126
(0:074) (0:172)
Standard deviation v 0:0025 0:0034
(0:0004) (0:0004)
AR coe¢ cient of productivity  0:956 0:971
(0:009) (0:009)
Standard deviation u 0:0135 0:0111
(0:0016) (0:0021)
Notes: The gures in parenthesis are standard errors. The superscripts  and y denote statistical
signicance at the ve and ten percent level, respectively.
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Figure 1: Adjustment Cost Functions
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Figure 2: Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks. Asymmetric Costs
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Figure 3: Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks. Quadratic Costs
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